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THE RIGHT TO CONSUL AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL: A CRITICAL RE-EXAMINING OF STATE V.
MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ
MARSHALL J. RAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, millions of foreign nationals may be arrested or detained in
a given year for a variety of reasons.' The prospect of detention in general may be
intimidating, but for an individual being held in a foreign land the experience can
be disconcerting. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Convention),2 a multilateral treaty to which the United States is a party, should
provide some aid to persons facing such situations through its guarantees to consular
access and communication. The United States, however, has struggled to honor its
commitments under Article 36. This struggle is partly a result of the manner in
which American federal and state courts have interpreted the treaty."
This Note discusses the approach that the New Mexico Supreme Court has taken
on questions concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It then
suggests a workable approach that will bring the state into compliance with its
responsibilities under the treaty without making drastic jurisprudential leaps.
Part II examines the legal background against which New Mexico's leading case
on the matter, State v. Martinez-Rodriguez,5 was decided, including the leading
federal, international, and state case law, as well as the underlying legal principles
that make judicial enforcement of Article 36 a difficult matter.6 Part III explains
State v. Martinez-Rodriguez and its rationale, including its finding that the
Convention creates no individually enforceable right,7 and its dicta concerning
whether prejudice can ever flow from a violation of Article 36. 8 Part IV then
analyses the rationale of Martinez-Rodriguez and demonstrates how it should be
reconsidered. 9 Specifically, it demonstrates that the New Mexico Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Convention is contrary to the text of Article 36 and to the
International Court of Justice's (ICJ)'° interpretation of that text." It also shows that

* J.D. expected, May 2008. 1 would like to thank Professor Norman Bay for his guidance in preparing this
Note. I would also like to thank the Editorial Board of the New Mexico Law Review for their helpful comments.
Finally, I would also like to thank my wife, Melanie.
1. Alan Macina, Comment, Avena & Other Mexican Nationals: The Litmus for Lagrand & the Future of
Consular Rights in the United States, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 115, 118 (2003).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963,21 U.S.T. 77 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. Kelly Trainer, Comment, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United States Courts,
13 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 227, 230 (2000) ("American courts have continually found ways to keep from affording
foreign nationals their rights under the Vienna Convention.").

4. Id.
5.

2001-NMSC-029, 33 P.3d 267.

6. See infra Part H.
7. See infra Part IH.B.1.
8. See infra Part llI.B.3.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. "The International Court of Justice is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations (UN)."
International Court of Justice, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).
Its functions include settling disputes between states (where it has jurisdiction to do so) and issuing advisory
opinions at the request of international agencies. Id. With respect to the Vienna Convention on Consular relations,
the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear disputes between States, pursuant to the Optional Protocol found in the treaty.
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the New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on State Department interpretation and
United States Supreme Court precedent has been undercut by subsequent
developments. 2 This Note then examines the New Mexico Supreme Court's dicta
concerning prejudice and suggests a reading of the court's prejudice analysis that
will allow for a vindication of the right to consular access. 13 Part V suggests a viable
way to supply detainees who have suffered a violation of their rights under the
Vienna Convention with an appropriate remedy. 14 Finally, Part VI explains the
importance of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and the reasons that it should be
honored.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 16 is a multilateral treaty that the
United States signed in 1963'" and ratified in 1969.18 The treaty served to organize
a previously haphazard consular institution among nations by defining "consular
rights, privileges, and duties among signatory nations."' 9 Article 36 of the
Convention establishes principles protecting communication between foreign
nationals and their consular officers.2 ° With respect to foreign nationals who have
been imprisoned, Article 36 provides that
if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State [the State in
which the foreign national is being detained] shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State [the state of origin] if.. .a national of that State
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody. 2'
Furthermore, Article 36 states that "authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of [these] rights. 22 Finally, Article 36, among other things, defers
enforcement of its provisions to the law of the receiving state, with the proviso that
"said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are intended. 23 Read together, these
provisions guarantee that a foreign national detained in a signatory state shall be

Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, art. I [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; see also infra note 148. The ICJ's rulings are not binding precedent
on American courts. See infra note 148.
11. See infra Part V.A.
12. See infra Part IV.C-D.
13. See infra Part V.E.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra PartVI.
16. Vienna Convention, supra note 2.
17. Id.
18. Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: An International Human Rights
Perspective, 43 S.TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1145 (2002).
19. Michael Fleishman, Note, Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in Defense of
Its Foreign Nationals in UnitedStates DeathPenalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359, 362 (2003).
20. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(1).
21. Id. art. 36(1)(b).
22. Id.
23. Id. art. 36(2).
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notified without delay of the right to contact his consular post. 24 Some commentators
have sought to analogize this guarantee to Miranda warnings.2 5 In many respects,
the two sets of rights are similar. For example, under both the Vienna Convention
and Miranda, the detainee's ability to exercise the pertinent right is "premised on
the arresting [officials'] duty to inform," so the duty to notify foreign detainees
about their rights to consular access is "akin to the Miranda prophylactic against
coercive sequestration. 26
The two sets of rights, however, have important differences. First, the lack of
"procedural urgency" and the time delays permitted in cases of consular notification
indicate that the rights under the Convention do not carry a prohibition against
interrogation pending consular access, nor do they provide a right to silence
independent of or in addition to Miranda.27 More importantly, "Mirandarights are
attributed directly to the Constitution, while consular rights are derived from a
treaty., 28 Such differences bear especially heavily on any discussion of the proper
remedy for violations of Article 36.29 Especially where suppression of statements or
evidence gathered in violation of Article 36 is concerned, this distinction has been
critical in the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of suppression as a remedy.3 °
What is troubling is that despite having signed and ratified the Convention, and
despite its own reliance on the treaty, recent high profile litigation has shown the
United States to be a notorious violator of Article 36.31For example, the failure of
the United States to comply with the treaty has been irksome for various countries
whose citizens have faced serious criminal charges.32 Many of those countries'
citizens have faced severe consequences, including capital convictions and death
sentences, without ever receiving the notice or consular assistance guaranteed in the
Vienna Convention.33 For that reason, other countries have sought means to compel

24. Fleishman, supranote 19, at 365. In fact, Article 36 took on its final form as the result of a compromise
"between strict mandatory notification and no notification." Id.
25. Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Activities During 1999
Through October2000, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 315, 327 (2001) (describing "those who seek to enforce provisions
of the [Convention] as a kind of "'consular Miranda warning"'); see also Cara S. O'Driscoll, The Execution of
Foreign Nationalsin Arizona: Violations of the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 323,
327 (2000) ("In many instances, the rights under the Vienna Convention are seen as fundamental as Miranda
rights.") (citation omitted).
26. Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 151-52 (1999).
27. Id. at 152; Sanchez-Uamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669,2681 (2006) ("Article 36 has nothing whatsoever
to do with searches or interrogations."). Miranda rights rise out of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination and the right to counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) ("[W]e hold that an
individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with
the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning
is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.").
28. Luna & Sylvester, supra note 26, at 153.
29. See infra Part VI.A.
30. See infra Part V.A for a discussion of the Court's reasoning in rejecting suppression as a remedy.
31. See Curtis Bradley et al., Discussion, Medellin v. Dretke: Federalismand InternationalLaw, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 669 (2005) (summarizing some of the major cases that have dealt with the issue).
32. See, e.g., Lou Ann Bohn, Comment, Understandingthe Imposition of Capital Punishment on Foreign
Nationalsin the United States as a Human Rights Violation, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 435, 435-37 (2003) (discussing the
criticism that the United States has received for its obstinacy in such cases as Avena & Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31)).
33. Bradley et al., supra note 31, at 669-70; see also Fleishman, supra note 19, at 359.
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the United States to honor the treaty. These attempts to seek U.S. compliance with
35 and
Article 36 are highlighted in the cases of Breard v. Greene,34 LaGrand,
Avena,36 discussed below.
B. Breard v. Greene, the First U.S. Supreme Court DecisionDiscussingArticle
36, Sets the Stagefor Lower Court Confusion
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to discuss violations of the consular notice
provisions of the Convention was Breard v. Greene, a habeas corpus action decided
in 1998.37 The defendant, Angel Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, argued that his
conviction and death sentence should be overturned because his rights under the
Vienna Convention were violated.38 Before the Supreme Court heard Breard's
appeal, Paraguay, his nation of origin, instituted proceedings in the International
Court of Justice on his behalf.39 Although the ICJ issued a preliminary order
requiring the United States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in [ICJ] proceedings,"'
the Supreme Court decided not to intervene because the defendant procedurally
defaulted his claim, and the state of Virginia executed Breard.4 t
In declining to intervene, the Supreme Court set the paradigm that would largely
be followed in federal and state courts hearing similar claims. First, the Court
sidestepped what would seem to be the threshold issue of whether the Convention
provides a right that may be judicially enforced.4 3 Instead, the Court held that even
if such a right existed, Breard was barred from raising it in a habeas corpus action
because of procedural default. 44 The Court also discussed the possibility that, under
a "harmless error" standard, Breard would not have prevailed.45
Brearddisregarded an ICJ order, failed to answer the question of whether Article
36 grants standing to individual detainees to raise it in a judicial proceeding, and

34. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
35. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27).
36. 2004 I.C.J. 128.
37. 523 U.S. at 371.
38. Id. at 373. Breard had been convicted five years earlier for the attempted rape and brutal murder of Ruth
Dickie, and the physical evidence against him was compelling. See Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670,
673-74 (Va. 1994).
39. Breard,523 U.S. at 374. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out
of the Vienna Convention. See Optional Protocol, supra note 10, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. I.
40. Breard,523 U.S. at 374.
41. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, JudicialIndependence in InternationalTribunals,93 CAL. L. REV. 1,
39 (2005). Procedural default is a doctrine governing habeas corpus cases whereby a defendant will be said to have
"procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, [and] the claim may [then] be raised in habeas
only if the defendant can first demonstrate either 'cause' and actual 'prejudice,' or that he is 'actually innocent.'
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (citations omitted).
42. See infra Parts ll.D-E for a discussion of the most important domestic case law since Breard.
43. Breard,523 U.S. at 377 ("[N]either the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides
a foreign nation a private right of action in United States' courts...."); id. at 376 ("[The Convention] arguably
confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest....").
44. Id. at 375 ("It is clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the Vienna Convention
by failing to raise that claim in the state courts.").
45. Id. at 377; see also Luna & Sylvester, supranote 26, at 149 ("In dicta, the Supreme Court also approved
a 'harmless error' standard for violations of the Vienna Convention and questioned the viability of Breard's claim
under that standard.").
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adopted an application of procedural default that the ICJ would later criticize. In the
years following the Breardruling, the ICJ had the opportunity to hear two important
cases, one brought by Germany (LaGrand)and the other by Mexico (Avena). In
those cases, the ICJ attempted to answer the questions left by Breardand to give an
authoritative view on how Article 36 should be implemented.
C. The Rulings of the InternationalCourt of Justice
6

1. LaGrand1
Shortly after Breard was executed, a striking repetition of Breard's story
unfolded. In Arizona, two brothers from Germany, Karl and Walter LaGrand, were
on death row. 47 A few days after Karl's execution, and a few days before Walter's
scheduled execution, Germany followed the same path as Paraguay and initiated
proceedings in the ICJ. 48 Germany asserted that the LaGrand brothers had been
denied their right to consular notification. 49 Although the relief sought by Germany
was "carefully framed" as a matter between states, rather than for the benefit of an
individual, as a practical matter Germany was seeking relief for one of its citizens,
not for the country.5 °
As in Breard, the order from the ICJ to stay the execution was ineffective and
Arizona executed Walter LaGrand shortly after the order was promulgated.'
Offended by the way in which the United States had disregarded its authority, the
ICJ proceeded with the LaGrand case despite its apparent mootness and later issued
a final judgment.52
In the final judgment, the ICJ concluded that Article 36 of the Convention created
an individual right and that a detainee could therefore seek a judicial remedy for its
violation.53 Furthermore, the court ruled that the procedural default rule, as applied

46. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27).
47. Id. 14 ("On 14 December 1984, [the LaGrand brothers were] sentenced to death for first degree
murder....").
48. Bernard H. Oxman & William J. Aceves, LaGrand(Germany v. United States), 93 AM. J. INr'L L. 210,
210 (2002).
49. See generally LaGrand,2001 I.C.J. 104 for detailed discussions of all of Germany's arguments.
50. See Bohn, supra note 32, at 454. Germany based its arguments not so much on the pending violation
of a German national's human rights, but rather on the imminent infliction on Germany of yet another injury by the
United States in addition to the original Vienna Convention breach. Id.
51. Bohn, supra note 32, at 457.
52. Id.
53. LaGrand,2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 89. Courts have alternatively framed the issue in terms of standing. See, e.g.,
Zavala v. State, 739 NE.2d 135, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("[M]any courts, including the United States Supreme
Court[,] have suggested that a party does have an individual 'right' under the Vienna Convention that grants the
party 'standing' to seek redress from an alleged violation of the treaty."); Garcia v. State, 17 P.3d 994, 996 (Nev.
2001) ("[T]here is an initial question as to whether the defendant has standing to enforce his rights under the Vienna
Convention...."). In State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, the New Mexico Supreme Court used standing language
interchangeably with references to "judicially enforceable individual rights." Compare 2001-NMSC-029, 110, 33
P.3d 267, 272 ("IT]he threshold question is whether an individual foreign national has standing to assert a claim
under the [Convention] in a domestic criminal case."), with id. 15, 33 P.3d at 274 ("[W]e... determine that the
provisions of [Article 36] do not create legally enforceable individual rights."). Therefore, in order to raise a
violation of Article 36, a court must find that a detainee has standing to do so, and that standing must arise out of
the treaty.
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in LaGrand, denied legal significance to Vienna Convention violations and that it
therefore resulted in a breach of Article 36. 4 In addition, the ICJ stated that
if the United States... should fail in its obligation of consular notification to the
detriment of German nationals, an apology would not suffice in cases where the
individuals concerned have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted
and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence,
it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation
of the rights set forth in the Convention.55
The ICJ, therefore, demanded that a remedy consisting of review and
reconsideration of sentences and convictions be available in the case of a violation
of the Vienna Convention.56 Rather than defining this remedy explicitly, the ICJ
explained that "[t]his obligation can be carried
out in various ways. The choice of
' 57
means must be left to the United States.
Following the ruling in LaGrand, Mexico instituted proceedings against the
United States in the ICJ, raising nearly the same issues. That case, Avena, is the most
recent ICJ ruling on Article 36, and it expands on the ruling in LaGrand.
2. Avena
A few years after LaGrand, the ICJ again ruled on similar issues in Avena and
OtherMexican Nationals (Mexico v. UnitedStates) (Avena).5 8 In Avena, the government of Mexico argued that the United States violated the Convention in the cases
of fifty-four Mexican nationals who were on death row in the United States at the
time.5 9 Mexico also demanded that the United States "enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights afforded by Article 36 are intended," 6 and that
the United States "must take the steps necessary and sufficient to establish a
meaningful remedy at law for violations of the rights afforded to Mexico and its
nationals by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 6 1
In its ruling in Avena, the ICJ reiterated the finding of LaGrandthat the Vienna
Convention created an individually enforceable right.62 The court also reaffirmed its
earlier ruling that, in the cases of defendants claiming their rights under Article 36
of the Convention, the United States must not use the procedural default doctrine
when such use impedes the purposes of the Convention.6 3 Finally, the ICJ fleshed

54. Lagrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, H 90-91.

55. Id. 1 125.
56. See id. 1126.
57. Id. 125.
58. 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31). The ICJ did not rule on Avena until after the New Mexico Supreme Court
heard and ruled on State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 33 P.3d 267, the case that will be analyzed in
this Note. Consequently, Avena does not speak to the analysis of that case. It does, however, bear on the
implications for future cases in New Mexico and is therefore presented here.
59. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128,

12.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. 9140 ("The Court would recall that, in the LaGrandcase, it recognized that 'Article 36, paragraph 1
[of the Vienna Convention], creates individual rights....'"
(first alteration in original)).
63. Id. 1 112. The ICJ did not say that the procedural default rule, per se, violates the Convention. Id. Instead,
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out the remedy of review and reconsideration. 64 The court explained that the review
and reconsideration should be a judicial process65 and that it should take into
account the legal 66consequences of a violation and whether the violation "caused
actual prejudice.

D. The Most Recent Word of the U.S. Supreme Court

Since the ICJ ruled in LaGrand and Avena, the U.S. Supreme Court has been
asked in several cases to consider whether the Vienna Convention affords an
individual right and what possible remedies may be appropriate if one exists. The
most recent of those cases is Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.6 7 In that case, however, the
majority passed on the opportunity to decide whether the Vienna Convention creates
an individually enforceable right.6t Instead, it spoke to what it characterized as the
dispositive issues of procedural default 69 and the inappropriateness of requiring
exclusion of evidence as a result of violations of the Convention. 70 By declining to
decide whether Article 36 confers an individual right, the Court left a split among
the circuit courts, and accordingly considerable uncertainty.7 1 It is notable, however,
that four justices expressed their view that the Vienna Convention creates
individually enforceable rights. 72 The majority expressed no disapproval of that
notion but merely declined to decide the question.73

Although it declined to decide whether the Convention creates individual rights,
the Supreme Court did express strong disapproval of the notion that suppression
should be allowed as a remedy for violations.74 The Court specifically held that
"neither the Vienna Convention itself nor our precedents applying the exclusionary
rule support suppression of [defendant's] statements to police. 7 ' The Court

it explained that the ."problem arises when the procedural default rule does not allow [a detainee] to challenge a
conviction and sentence by claiming.. .that the competent national authorities failed to comply with their obligations
[under the treaty]."' Id. (quoting LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 90 (June 27)).
64. Id. 131.
65. Id. 140.
66. Id. 121.
67. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
68. Id. at 2677 ("[W]e find it unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants
individuals enforceable rights.").
69. Id. at 2687 ("[Defendant] cannot show that normally applicable procedural default rules should be
suspended in light of the type of right he claims."). See supra note 41 for an explanation of the procedural default
doctrine.
70. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 at 2682 ("[N]either the Vienna Convention itself nor our precedents
applying the exclusionary rule support suppression of [defendant's] statements to police.").
71. See State v. Prasertphong, 75 P.3d 675,688 n.7 (Ariz. 2003) (illustrating that different courts in different
circuits have come to different conclusions on the question of whether Article 36 creates an individually enforceable
right), vacatedon othergrounds, 541 U.S. 1039 (2004), affid, 114 P.3d 828 (Ariz. 2005).
72. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated, "I agree that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
grants rights that may be invoked by an individual in a judicial proceeding." Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2688
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, said that he would
have decided the question of whether an individual right existed in Article 36 and "would... answer it affirmatively."
Id. at 2691 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2677 ("Because we conclude that [the defendants] are not in any event entitled to relief on their
claims, we find it unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals enforceable
rights.").
74. Id. at 2678 ("It would be startling if the Convention were read to require suppression.").
75. Id. at 2682. The exclusionary rule, which calls for suppression of evidence or statements made in

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

reasoned that the exclusionary rule was mainly applied to remedy constitutional
violations, and that the violations of Article 36 were not constitutional in nature
(because treaties have statutory, rather than constitutional weight).76 Suppression of
statements or evidence, therefore, was not considered to be the appropriate remedy."
The Supreme Court therefore has answered some questions, but it remains
ambiguous on whether the Convention creates an individually enforceable right or
whether a detainee must rely on the intervention of his nation of origin. Because of
the lack of clear guidance, state courts have struggled to answer these questions
themselves and have split in different directions.
E. State Court Rulings on Article 36 of the Convention
With respect to the question of whether Article 36 creates an individually
enforceable right, the picture of state courts is similar to that of the federal courts.
Most have followed a pattern similar to that of the Supreme Court and have declined
to answer the question.78 Others have expressly decided that the Convention does
not create an individually enforceable right.79 It has been less common for state
courts to find that the convention does create an individually enforceable right, and
relief has been granted based on violations of Article 36 in only a few cases.80 One
of those cases, State v. Reyes,8' was subsequently repudiated in the jurisdiction in
which it was decided.82
Reyes is notable because it found the Vienna Convention to be an independent
source of relief.83 The remaining cases that have granted relief based on finding

violation of the Fourth Amendment, "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
[of protection from illegal search and seizure] generally through its deterrent effect." United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Its use has been extended to some contexts outside the Fourth Amendment, but typically the
Court is reluctant to do so. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2680-81.
76. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2680.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) ("It is not entirely clear
whether the Vienna Convention creates a privately enforceable right."); Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 953 (Fla.
2003) (recognizing that the Convention arguably creates a right, but declining to decide because no remedy was
available); Lopez v. State, 558 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Ga. 2002) (assuming, arguendo, that even if the Convention creates
such a right, "[a]ny rights created by the Vienna Convention do not rise to the level of a constitutional right" that
would invoke the exclusionary rule); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 151 (Iowa 2001) ("The majority of courts
assume, without deciding, such a right does exist, and then hold the requested remedy is inappropriate or the
defendant did not prove he was prejudiced by the alleged Article 36 violation.").
79. See, e.g., Gomez v. Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) ("'[W]e are convinced
that the Vienna Convention does not confer standing on an individual foreign national to assert a violation of the
treaty in a domestic criminal case."' (quoting State v. Navarro, 659 N.W.2d 487, 491 (2003)); State v. Longo, 148
P.3d 892, 898 (Or. 2006) ("Article 36 of the [Convention] does not create an individually enforceable right."))).
80. Id.
81. 740 A.2d 7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999), overruledas recognizedin State v. Vasquez, No. CR.A.98-01-0317R2, 2001 WL 755930 (Del.Super. Ct. May 23, 2001) (unpublished opinion). In the case, the court allowed
suppression of statements that were made by a detainee who had not been notified of his right to consular access.
Id. at 8, 14-15. In doing so, the court explained that "(1) the Vienna Convention is the law of the land...; (2) the
police conduct.. .violated Article 36 of the Convention; (3) Defendant.. asserted a Vienna Convention violation in
a timely manner; (4) Defendant has shown adequate prejudice to exist; and, (5) a violation Article 36 is ground for
suppressing incriminating statements." Id. at 14.
82. Ramirez v. State, 619 S.E.2d 668, 673 n.5 (Ga. 2005) ("[Reyes] has been widely criticized and finally
disapproved by the same court in State v. Vasquez." (citation omitted)).
83. Reyes, 740 A.2d, at 14 ("[A] violation of Article 36 is ground for suppressing incriminating statements
made by foreign nationals while in police or government custody.").
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Vienna Convention violations did so as part of the context of some other procedural
failing, not because of the Vienna Convention alone. For example, in Ledezma v.
State," the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the defendant had "sufficiently
established a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 8' As part of the basis for
that decision, the court discussed the prejudice that could result from Vienna
Convention violations.16 It admonished criminal defense attorneys to apprise
themselves of its importance and of the importance of consular access to foreign
detainees.87 Ledezma is odd, however, in that the court claimed not to decide
whether the Vienna Convention provides an individually enforceable right 88 while
at the same time discussing the prejudicial effect such a violation could have and
suggesting to criminal defense lawyers that they have a duty to be aware of Article
36.89

The state courts, therefore, have not been unified on the question of whether
Article 36 creates an individually enforceable right. Instead, most have avoided
deciding, 90 and the remaining courts have split. 9' The state courts have, however,
overwhelmingly stated that, if such a right did exist, a litigant raising the issue must
show some prejudice as a result of any alleged violation. 92 Furthermore, state courts
have been overwhelmingly hostile to the notion that suppression would be required
as a remedy for Article 36 violations.93 The uncertainty in the state courts reflects
the uncertainty of the law in the Supreme Court of the United States. Because of this
confusion, Article 36 is not being adequately enforced. Furthermore, the state courts
offer little guidance on what the proper approach should be.
F. Difficulties in Honoring the ConsularNotice Provisions
The difficulties that the United States has had in honoring the consular notice
provisions of the Convention have stemmed at least partly from the fact that
enforcement of the provisions falls mainly on state and local law enforcement.94
Unlike many of the other signatories to the Convention, the United States must deal
with the tensions inherent in a federalist system that divides sovereignty between the

84. 626 N.W. 2d 134 (Iowa 2001).
85. Id. at 152.
86. Id. at 151-52.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 150 ("We do not decide today whether the Convention actually creates an individual right to
notification. Furthermore, we do not decide whether trial counsel renders ineffective assistance if he fails to inform
a client.. .of the right....").
89. Id. at 152.
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
92. People v. Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) ("Those courts that recognize a
possible private right generally have held that the defendant must show prejudice." (citations omitted)).
93. State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 18, 33 P.3d 267,275 ("[O]ther courts have...routinely
held that suppression of evidence is not the proper remedy for a violation of the [Convention] because the treaty
does not provide suppression as a remedy and does not create any fundamental, constitutional rights.").
94. Note, Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of the Law of
Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2658 (2003) ("With respect to the Vienna Convention.... its ratification history
indicates that the Senate was well aware that the burden of enforcing the consular notification provisions would fall
to state and local governments." (citations omitted)).
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states and the federal government.9 5 Specifically, much of law enforcement has been
considered a part of the police power that has traditionally been viewed as a function
of the states, rather than of the federal government.96 For that reason, the
governmental entity that negotiated and signed the treaty-the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government-must depend on states for the enforcement of Article 36.
In addition, the context of Article 36, being essentially a law enforcement matter,
gives both state and federal courts a special responsibility to ensure that the United
States honors the commitments it has made under the Convention because it is in the
judicial system that the issues will be raised.9 7 Despite this responsibility, state
courts have had considerable difficulty carrying out that duty because of the lack of
guidance. Both federal and state courts have heard a number of cases in which
Vienna Convention violations have been raised, and different states have adopted
different approaches in how they answer the basic questions concerning the meaning
of Article 36 of the Convention.9 8 Such a diversity of judicial approaches to
interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations has not helped the United
States in fulfilling its obligations under the treaty because foreign detainees have
little way of knowing what their options are in judicial settings that do not uniformly
give effect to the command of the treaty.
It was against this legal landscape of uncertainty that the New Mexico Supreme
Court heard and decided the case analyzed in this Note, State v. Martinez99

Rodriguez.

95. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to point out that the federalist structure of
the United States is further complicated by the existence of tribal sovereign entities. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal
Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEv. L.J. 285, 285 (2003) ("Indian tribes have been something of an
enigma in the federal Constitutional scheme for more than 200 years."). The status of tribes also raises questions
about enforcement of the consular notice provisions of the convention. For more information, see, for example,
Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibilityfor Human Rights Violations by American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9 (2006) (discussing the status of indigenous tribes in the United States and their potential
for violating international human rights laws and other obligations such as the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) ("[T]he suppression of [violent crime]
has always been the prime object of the States' police power....").
97. See Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 94, at 2654 (discussing the fact that the
burdens of Article 36 fall on state and local governments).
98. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 ofthe Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations: The InternationalCourt
of Justice in Mexico v. United States (Avena) Speaks Emphaticallyto the Supreme Courtof the United States About
the FundamentalNature of the Right to Consul, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (2004). Kadish mentions at least three
basic approaches that courts have taken in deciding Article 36 issues:
Some courts have interpreted Article 36 to confer no fundamental right, and therefore no remedy
is available. Other courts have held that individual rights may exist, but there is no remedy in the
absence of a finding of prejudice. Finally, some courts have found that even if a defendant's
claim passes procedural muster, no remedy is available if the violation was the product of
"harmless error."
Id. Notably, the Tenth Circuit has adopted the second view. Id. at 14-15 (citing United States v. Minjares-Alvarez,
264 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2001), which declined to decide whether Article 36 conferred an individual right and argued
that, where there was no prejudice, suppression was not available as a remedy). In addition to the three above
approaches, because so many Vienna Convention claims are raised in habeas corpus proceedings, courts have often
used procedural bars to avoid reaching the merits of Article 36 questions. See infra note 107; see also SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682-83 (2006) (discussing whether procedural default rules may preclude a
litigant from raising an Article 36 claim).
99. 2001-NMSC-029, 33 P.3d 267. The next major ICJ case, Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31), would not be decided until 2004. See supra Part I.C.2.
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m. STATE V. MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ
New Mexico is among the many states that have declined to adopt the ICJ's
interpretation of the Vienna convention. t ° State v. Martinez-Rodriguez,'' decided
in 2001, is the major precedent on the issue in the state.
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory

In Martinez-Rodriguez, the New Mexico Supreme Court heard the appeal of
Mexican national Ricardo Martinez-Rodriguez.'0 2 Martinez-Rodriguez had been
convicted after a jury trial for three counts of first-degree murder, kidnapping with
great bodily harm, and conspiracy to commit murder." 3
Martinez-Rodriguez sought to have his convictions overturned on the ground,
inter alia, that his rights to consular notification under the Vienna Convention had
been violated when law enforcement failed to notify him of his right to consular
access upon arrest.' 4 This right that Martinez-Rodriguez claimed was violated
allegedly arises out of Article 36(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.'0 5 Consequently, he asked that statements he made to police
be
6
suppressed on the ground that his rights under Article 36 were violated.'
B. The Reasoning of Martinez-Rodriguez
1. Finding No Individually Enforceable Right
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected Martinez-Rodriguez' Vienna
Convention claim by holding that the Convention does not create an individually
enforceable right and that a detainee therefore cannot litigate the issue himself' 0 7
The court reached this conclusion using traditional methods of treaty interpretation
by observing that, in general, an international treaty is presumed not to create
individual rights unless the document explicitly provides one.'0 8 Based on the presumption against the existence of individual rights in treaties, the court interpreted

100. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
101. 2001-NMSC-029, 33 P.3d 267.
102. Id. 1 1, 33 P.3d at 267.
103. Id.
104. The defendant, Martinez-Rodriguez, had filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements he made based
on a violation of the Convention. Id. 8, 33 P.3d at 271. For this reason, no independent procedural barriers
prevented him from raising the issue on appeal. See supra note 63 (discussing procedural default). Many of the cases
involving violations of the Convention have involved the impact of procedural default on a violation, and procedural
default has therefore been used as a way to dispose of these cases without deciding many of the questions addressed
in this case. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) ("By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim
in state court, [defendant] failed to exercise his rights....Having failed to do so, he cannot raise a claim of violation
of those rights now on federal habeas review."). The frequency with which procedural default has been used to
prevent foreign detainees from raising the issue of violation of the Convention prompted the ICJ to specifically hold
that such procedural bars should not be invoked in a way that undermines the obligations of the United States under
the treaty. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. One author has even referred to procedural default as "the
graveyard of so many Article 36 claims." Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular
Notification and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L 27, 46 (2000).
105. 2001-NMSC-0291 7, 33 P.3d at 271.
106. Id.
107. Id. 15, 33 P.3d at 274.
108. Id. 11,33 P.3d at 272.
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the text of the Convention, in conjunction with the language in its preamble, to find
no judicially enforceable right.'09
The New Mexico Supreme Court also cited Breardv. Greene,"0 a U.S. Supreme
Court decision, to demonstrate that Court's reluctance to find an individually
enforceable right in the context of a treaty."' The language from Breard that the
court quoted spoke to whether a nation had the right to bring an action. 112 The New
Mexico Supreme Court, however, explained that, "[w]ith the Supreme Court having
expressed doubt that a signatory nation has a private right of action in domestic
courts under the [Convention], it seems unlikely to us that the Court would find that
an individual criminal defendant could pursue an action.""..3
2. Diplomacy as the Proper Means of Enforcing the Treaty
The New Mexico Supreme Court deferred to the State Department's interpretation of Article 36, noting that "the treaty is dealing with matters of international
relations, not domestic criminal law .... The negotiation and administration of treaties
is a matter reserved to the Executive Branch of the federal government with
ratification by the Senate."'" 14 The court, therefore, refused to "depart from the
general principles of international law and the expressed position of the State
Department."' 5 As a result, the court left enforcement of the treaty to diplomatic
rather than judicial channels, thus foreclosing the possibility
of an individual raising
6
a Vienna Convention claim in a judicial proceeding. 1
3. A Lack of Prejudice
Even if an individual right is found to exist in Article 36, it will not be useful if
a detainee cannot show that a violation affected the outcome of his case in some
way. As dicta, the court explained that the defendant, Martinez-Rodriguez, did not
suffer prejudice as a result of any alleged violation of his right to notification of
consular access."' The court observed that, although the Mexican Consul had

submitted an affidavit describing the type of assistance it would have offered the
defendant, that assistance was duplicative of Miranda."18 In addition, the defendant

109. Id. 15, 33 P.3d at 274 ("The presumption against implying rights in international agreements weighs
against Defendant's position. We conclude that this Court should not depart from the general principles of
international law and the expressed position of the State Department to find that Defendant has a private right of
action...." (citation omitted)).
110. 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) ("[N]either the text nor the history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides
a foreign nation a private right of action in United States courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for
violation of consular notification provisions.").
111. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 16, 33 P.3d at 274.
112. 523 U.S. at 377 (referring to the lack of clarity as to whether a "foreign nation" can bring a private right
of action in U.S. courts).
113. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 16, 33 P.3d at 274.
114. Id. 14, 33 P.3d at 273 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I1,
§ 2, cl.
2).
115. id. 15, 33 P.3d at 274.
116. Id. l 14, 33 P.3d at 274.
117. Id. 17, 33 P.3d at 274-75.
118. Id. 20, 33 P.3d at 276. Specifically, the Consul claimed that, if the defendant had been advised of his
right to consular access, a consulate representative would have visited him and advised him not to speak to anyone,
and that such silence would not bring adverse consequences. Id. The consulate representative would have also
notified the defendant of a right to a certified interpreter and legal counsel. Id.
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had not made inculpatory statements, so the prejudicial effect on his trial of any
statements he did make was likely negligible." 9
At the same time, the court said that "[tihe advice [that the Consul would have
given] duplicates the rights guaranteed to Defendant by Miranda."'"2 This might
suggest that the Court would be strongly disinclined to find prejudice at all when the
usual constitutional guarantees, such as Miranda, are honored. In other words, under
such a view, federal constitutional guarantees would be presumed sufficient even for
foreign nationals, and because Martinez-Rodriguez had been advised of his Miranda
rights, he could not have suffered prejudice.
During its discussion of the lack of prejudice, the court registered its strong
disapproval of the use of suppression as a remedy for Vienna Convention violations
in the theoretical instance that a defendant could seek a judicial remedy for such
violations. 2 ' Suppression was not warranted, according to the court, because such
a remedy was designed to protect constitutional values, and signing the Vienna
Convention did not implicate the constitution such that a violation of the treaty
would give rise to a constitutional violation.' 2 2 Moreover, the text of the Convention
did not indicate a remedy of suppression. 23 Consequently, even if a defendant's
rights were violated, the court found that the Convention did not allow a defendant
to request that his statements be suppressed.
C. Justice Minzner's Concurrence in Martinez-Rodriguez
In a concurring opinion, Justice Minzner disagreed with the court's finding that
the Vienna Convention does not supply an individual right. 24 She interpreted the
text of the Convention as providing such a right, arguing that the reference to
"individuals" in the Preamble of the Convention should properly be read to refer to
"consular officials rather than civilian foreign nationals."" Justice Minzner also
26
cited the legislative history of the Convention to support her argument. 1

119. See id. 19, 33 P.3d at 275. With respect to prejudice, it is unclear whether the New Mexico Supreme
Court determined that in the case of Martinez-Rodriguez no prejudice was shown, or whether a violation of the
consular notice provisions in general could not be considered prejudicial. The court said that in this case the advice
of the Consul was duplicative of the Miranda rights. Id. 1 20, 33 P.3d at 276 ("The advice described by the Consul
duplicates the rights guaranteed to Defendant by Miranda."). If, however, the advice that the defendant would have
received was typical of what his Consul would provide to any of its nationals, lack of Consular access might almost
never be prejudicial. The defendant in Martinez-Rodriguez had been convicted of a shocking list of violent crimes,
and the physical evidence against him was overwhelming. The record showed that the defendant had been arrested
while driving a vehicle belonging to one of the victims. Id. 4, 33 P.3d at 270. Furthermore, several samples of his
fingerprints and DNA were discovered at the location of two of the murders, and other DNA evidence indicated that
he had had a sexual encounter with one of the victims. Id. 1 6, 33 P.3d at 271. The defendant's identity and association with the stolen car and the other defendants was corroborated by an eyewitness. Id. The court also observed
that he did not make any inculpatory statements prior to receiving legal representation and that he had received
notification of his Miranda rights. Id. 19, 33 P.3d at 275.
120. Id. [ 20, 33 P.3d at 276.
121. Id. V 18-19, 33 P.3d at 275-76.
122. Id. 18, 33 P.3d at 275 (citing Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1997)).
123. Id.
124. Id. 144, 33 P.3d at 282 (Minzner, J., concurring).
125. Id. 46, 33 P.3d at 282 (quoting Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)). The Preamble states that "the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but
to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts." Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T.
77, at 2.
126. See Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029,
47-48, 33 P.3d at 282-83 (Minzner, J., concurring)
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Next, Justice Minzner commented on the possibility of judicial remedies for
Article 36 violations. 27 According to Justice Minzner, the rights created under
Article 36 were designed to protect the procedural rights of foreign nationals and the
"appropriate remedy for violation of those rights seem[s].. .to be [a] proper subject[]
' 28
for judicial interpretation and construction."'
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ
The holding of Martinez-Rodriguez with respect to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, announced in September of 2001, came shortly after the ICJ's
ruling in LaGrand.LaGrandwas released in June of that same year, and in it the ICJ
concluded that the Vienna Convention did create an individually enforceable right
that the courts of the United States were bound to follow.' 29
The New Mexico Supreme Court did not mention the ICJ opinion, and it rejected
Martinez-Rodriguez' Vienna Convention claim using three basic arguments: First,
the court interpreted the Convention and held that the defendant had no claim
because the Convention created no individual right. 30 The court did so using
principles of treaty interpretation and also noted possible U.S. Supreme Court
disapproval of the existence of an individually enforceable right under the
Convention.'13 Second, the court noted that treaties are properly negotiated and
administered by "the Executive Branch of the federal government with ratification
by the Senate."'' 32 In making this argument, the court specifically deferred to the
State Departments' interpretation of the treaty as being enforceable through
diplomatic channels, saying that such an approach was necessary so that the United

(citing, inter alia, 2 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records, at 337, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.25/6, U.N. Sales. No. 63.X.2 (1963), for the proposition that the United States proposed language designed
to protect the foreign detainee).
127. Id. 148, 33 P.3d at 283.
128. Id. T148-49, 33 P.3d at 283.
129. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27). In LaGrand, the Federal Republic of Germany
instituted proceedings against the United States on behalf of two citizens who where on death row in Arizona. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text. Although both were executed before the ICJ's ruling, the ICJ insisted on
hearing and ruling on the case. See Lagrand,2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 34. In so doing, the ICJ found that the United States
had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Id. TI123-26.
130. See supraPart Ill.B.1.
131. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 16, 33 P.3d at 274. Missing from the New Mexico Supreme
Court's discussion is any mention of whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is self-executing. Under
U.S. law, treaties cannot create individual rights unless they are self-executing, or unless domestic implementing
legislation is enacted. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 111 cmt.
h (1987). Whether the Convention or Article 36 requires implementing legislation has not been squarely addressed
by New Mexico courts. Strong authority, however, suggests that the Convention, in its entirety, is self-executing.
First, during the ratification hearings, State Department Deputy Legal Adviser J. Edward Lyerly described the
Convention as "entirely self-executive [sic] and [not requiring] any implementing or complementing legislation."
S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app., at 5 (1969). This legislative history has been commonly cited as support for a finding
that the treaty is self-executing. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2694 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[fIt is common ground that the Convention is 'self-executi[ng]."' (citing S. ExEc. REP. No. 91-9, app.,
at 5 (1969)); Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 378 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing S. ExEc. REP. No. 91-9, app., at 5, and stating
that such statements by the State Department deserve "great weight"), opinion withdrawn andsuperseded,480 F.3d
822 (7th Cir. 2007); Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 94, at 2657 ("The Vienna Convention
is clearly a self-executing treaty....").
132. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 14, 33 P.3d at 274 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl. 2).
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States could present a coherent, unified approach to treaties. 133 Third, the court
found that, even if an individual had standing to bring an action to enforce the
Convention, no prejudice occurred where the treaty was violated and so no Vienna
Convention claim was born."3 Each of these grounds is examined and criticized
below.
A. Interpretationof the Treaty Should Lead to a Finding That Article 36 Creates
an Individually EnforceableRight
By its terms, Article 36 creates an individually enforceable right. 135 Subparagraph
(b), for example, states that "[t]he said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph."' 136 The New Mexico Supreme
Court countered this argument by citing to the Preamble of the Convention, which
says that the treaty is not designed to "'benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of functions by consular posts,',, 137 and by pointing out that the purpose
of Article 36 was, generically, to "'facilitat[e] the exercise of consular functions. '138
Beside the fact that the text of Article 36 speaks more to the meaning of Article
36 than the Preamble, the cited purposes of the Convention and of Article 36 that
are found in the Preamble do not contradict an existence of individual rights in the
treaty. In other words, even if Justice Minzner's argument that "the Preamble's
reference to 'individual[s]"' should only apply to consular officers is incorrect,' 39
the Preamble and the cited purposes of Article 36 are compatible with the existence
of individual rights. Given that Article 36 specifically refers to a person's "rights,' 40
it is possible that the treaty's framers found that certain individual rights were
necessary to ensure that its purposes (facilitating the exercise of consular functions)
would be properly brought about. It is, therefore, a tortured reading of the treaty to
infer that an explicitly stated individual right does not exist by invoking general
principles of Framers' intent when those principles are in no way hostile to the
existence of individual rights. The better approach is to adhere to the plain meaning
of the text to find that Article 36 does create individual rights.
Underlying the New Mexico Supreme Court's interpretation of the treaty,
however, is a more difficult issue. One commentator has noted that "[t]here is a
chasm between what U.S. courts consider to be the rule of individual rights under
treaties (treaties generally do not create individually enforceable rights) and what
international courts believe to be the rule of individual rights under treaties (that
treaties do create individual rights). "''4 The New Mexico Supreme Court invoked the

133. id.
134. See supra Part Ill.B.3.
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(b).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 13, 33 P.3d at 273 (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note
2, 21 U.S.T. 77, at 2).
138. Id. (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(1)).
139. Id. 46, 33 P.3d at 282 (Minzner, J., concurring) (quoting Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d
417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
140. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(1)(b).
141.

Adrienne M. Tranel, Note, The Ruling of the InternationalCourt ofJustice in Avena and Other Mexican

Nationals: Enforcing the Right to ConsularAssistance in U.S. Jurisprudence,20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 403, 456
(2005) (footnotes omitted).
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presumption against individual rights in treaties, stating that, "[a]s a general
rule,... treaties do not create personal rights." '42 From there, the court proceeded43to
find that the Convention does not provide for an individually enforceable right. 1
Such a "chasm" between the views of parties to a treaty is problematic,
considering the contractual nature of a treaty, but it is a problem whose resolution
is not necessary in the case of interpreting Article 36 of the Convention. Article 36
speaks for itself, and the ICJ has found a similar meaning in the text on multiple
occasions. Even in the face of a presumption against individual rights in treaties,
Article 36 is explicit in its language concerning detaining authorities' duty to inform
the "person concerned" of "his rights."' 44 In addition, the ICJ, the primary body
responsible for interpreting the treaty in disputes between parties, 145 has determined
that an individual right exists. 146 By the time the Vienna Convention questions were
ruled on in Martinez-Rodriguez, the ICJ had stated in LaGrandthat, "[b]ased on the
text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates
individual rights. 147
Even though an ICJ ruling is not binding precedent for American courts, 14 8 the
ruling should have been respected for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court of
the United States has said that an ICJ interpretation deserves "respectful
consideration" in judicial proceedings. 149
Duly entered treaties are the supreme law
of the land, 5 ° and U.S. courts have rightly looked to ICJ decisions for guidance
15
when that court has ruled on issues of treaties to which the United States is bound.'
In addition, U.S. courts should respect ICJ treaty interpretations because a "treaty
is designed 'to establish a single, agreed-upon regime' for the signatories."' 52 In

142. Martinez-Rodriguez,2001-NMSC-029, 1 11, 33 P.3d at 272.
143. Id. 1 15, 33 P.3d at 274.
144. See supra Part IV.A.1.
145. The Optional Protocol of the Convention provides that "[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the [ICJ] and may accordingly be
brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."
Optional Protocol, supra note 10, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. I. The United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol in
2005, raising new questions about the authority that an ICJ interpretation of the treaty should have in U.S. courts.
Mark J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
ConsularRelations: The Supreme Court, the Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1185, 1190
(2006). It is at least clear that U.S. courts do not view themselves as bound by ICJ rulings and, instead, give them
"respectful consideration." Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998). It is also true that "each member of the
United Nations has agreed to comply with decisions of the [ICJ] 'in any case to which it is a party."' SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (citation omitted).
146. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 89 (June 27).
147. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, 177.
148. See Exparte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 330 (2006) ("A vena is not binding federal law.....
149. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998). In Breard,the Court declined to follow the ICJ because it
found no clear language in the treaty suggesting that it should override well-settled procedural default rules in the
face of a Vienna Convention violation. Id.
150. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2 ("[AIU treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
151. See Susan L. Karamanian, "OutsourcingAuthority?" Citation to ForeignCourtPrecedentin Domestic
Jurisprudence:Briefly Resuscitatingthe Great Writ: The InternationalCourtof Justice and the U.S. Death Penalty,
69 ALB.L.REV. 745, 748-49 (2006).
152. Id. at 749 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: ForeignAuthority in the FederalCourts, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 305, 305 (2004)). Even though the United States has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol
granting jurisdiction to the ICJ in disputes arising from interpretation of the Convention, this principle of uniformity
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other words, the treaty can be viewed in contractual terms. The United States
benefits by being a party to the treaty and should therefore accept its burdens. In the
interest of protecting parties' settled expectations, American courts should seek to
implement the treaty in a way that comports with the view held by the other parties.
Furthermore, to ensure certainty in the application of the treaty, U.S. courts
should give proper respect, even if not precedential weight, to the rulings of the ICJ.
The court in Martinez-Rodriguez, therefore, should have consulted the ICJ opinion
in LaGrand, and in the future New Mexico courts should be willing to at least
examine the reasoning of Lagrand as well as the subsequent high profile decision
in Avena.'53
B. The States' ProperPlace in Interpretingand Enforcing Treaties
The U.S. Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,"' 54 and "[ulpon ratification,
a treaty becomes the law of the land on an equal plane with federal statutes. ' 155
Given that the nation, and not an individual state, enters into treaties, the New
Mexico Supreme Court was correct in stating that the national interest should be
"'expressed through a single authoritative voice. ' ' 156 The court, however, arguably
ignored the duty that states have to implement the treaty and to contribute to the
nation's commitment to honor its obligations.
First, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."' 157 And although the Vienna Convention places a burden on states,
"'treaties have invaded the most sensitive spheres of state autonomy'....With respect

to the Vienna Convention in particular, its ratification history indicates that the
Senate was well aware that the burden of enforcing the consular notification
provisions would fall to state and local governments." 158 That the Convention
invades the sphere of state police power is therefore not a sufficient justification for
failure to implement its terms.
Regardless of this broad view of states' duty to enforce the Vienna Convention,
some commentators have raised arguments based on federalism concerns. For
example, one commentator has observed that the consular notice provisions of the
still applies, because the United States is still bound by the treaty even if it does not submit to ICJ jurisdiction in
future live disputes. If parties to the treaty ignore ICJ rulings, the Convention's usefulness will be undermined as
each party adopts its own disparate view of what its provisions mean.
153. Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31). In Avena, the ICJ found
that the United States violated the Convention in the case of several Mexican nationals who were on death row and
that it owed them a remedy. Id. 1 128. Furthermore, the court reiterated its position, as stated in LaGrand, that the
Convention creates individually enforceable rights. Id. 1 40.
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
155. State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 11, 33 P.3d 267, 272 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2).
156. Id. 14, 33 P.3d at 273 (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir. 2000)).
157. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2; see also Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 94, at 2657
(arguing that because of the Supremacy Clause, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations "supersedes
inconsistent state law" (footnote omitted)).
158. Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough, supra note 94, at 2658 (quoting David M. Golove, TreatyMaking and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundationsof the NationalistConception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH.

L. REv. 1075, 1101 (2000)).
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Vienna Convention may constitute a form of commandeering 59 because they
affirmatively require state and local law enforcement to take certain actions.160 The
same author, however, concluded that Article 36 does not violate
anticommandeering principles because of "conditional preemption." 61 For example,
if Congress had the power to prohibit states from arresting foreign nationals, it could
give states the choice between not being able to arrest foreign nationals and having
the ability to arrest them under the condition that they honor Article 36 of the
Convention. 62 In other words, the federal government could encourage states to
comply with the treaty by agreeing to refrain from passing undesirable, but constitutional, legislation. 63 In addition, U.S. courts have observed that the Convention
provides that "[t]he rights referred to [in Article 36] shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State."' 64 Considering the Constitution
and the reality that treaties may impose burdens on state governments, the New
Mexico Supreme Court should not have been so hasty to sidestep its obligation to
enforce the treaty.
C. A Single Authoritative Voice
The New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on the State Department as the single
authoritative voice in interpreting the Vienna Convention is flawed because the State
Department's views are not always consistent. To support the notion that the "single
authoritative voice" is contrary to the finding of an individually enforceable right
under the Convention, the court quoted the U.S. State Department as saying that
"the [only] remedies for failures of consular notification under the [Vienna
Convention]
are diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international
165
law."'

The court was correct to observe that the State Department's view concerning the
treaty deserves "'great weight."" 66 A court, however, has the ultimate responsibility
to interpret a treaty for itself. 67 If the State Department takes a position that is
contrary to the pronouncements of the ICJ, which has the duty of interpreting the
treaty as among party nations, then a court is left to choose between opposite views

159. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that Congress cannot commandeer state officers. Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
160. Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1317, 1317 (1999)
(discussing whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention "contravenes the anticommandeering principle articulated
in Printz v. United States and New York v. United States" (footnotes omitted)).
161. Id. at 1329-30.
162. See id.
163. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). "[W]here Congress has the authority to
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice
of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation." Id.
(citations omitted).
164. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(2).
165. State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 14, 33 P.3d 267, 274 (alterations in original).
166. Id.1 14,33 P.3d at 273 (quoting United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980,987 (10th Cit. 2001)).
167. See id. (quoting Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 987). With respect to federal courts, the Supreme Court
of the United States recently argued that the "judicial power includes the duty 'to say what the law is'... [and if]
treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal
law 'is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department."' Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669,
2684 (2006) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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of two authorities, neither of which is binding upon it, but both of which should
carry substantial weight in the determination. In such a quandary, the most correct
result would be to adopt the position that best helps the United States honor its
commitments under the treaty. In this case, that means a court should follow the ICJ
and find an individual right. As state courts adopt this view and allow standing for
individuals raising the issue of Vienna Convention violations, the United States
would presumably lose its notoriety for blatantly ignoring the Consular Notice
Provisions.
As stated above, the State Department may not be the unified voice against
finding an individual right that the New Mexico Court believed it to be. The State
Department's view that the Convention should be enforced through diplomacy,
which is quoted in Martinez-Rodriguez,'68 arguably conflicts with language contained in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual. The manual speaks to the
provisions of Article 36: "Our most important function as consular officers is to
protect and assist private U.S. citizens or nationals traveling or residing abroad. Few
of our citizens need that assistance more than those who have been arrested in a
foreign country or imprisoned in a foreign jail.' ' 169 It is strange, then, that the State
Department would express such concern for individuals when they are U.S. citizens
abroad and yet imply that individuals are not the concern of these provisions of the
Vienna Convention when foreign detainees in the United States invoke them.
In addition, even if the Court in Martinez-Rodriguez properly relied on the view
expressed by the State Department to find no individually enforceable right under
the Convention, the message from the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
has arguably changed since that time and therefore warrants a reexamination of at
least that portion of the Court's rationale.
In particular, the executive branch recently adopted a position in line with the ICJ
with respect to at least one ruling. In the wake of the ICJ's ruling in Avena,"7 ° the
President of the United States issued a memorandum to the U.S. Attorney General
stating, "I have determined.. .that the United States will discharge its inter-national
obligations under the decision of the [ICJ] in [Avena], by having State courts give
effect to the decision.""'7' This generalized endorsement of the ruling in Avena
is the finding that the
implicitly entails an endorsement of its parts, one of 7which
2
Convention creates an individually enforceable right.

168. The State Department has said that "'the [only] remedies for failure of consular notification under the
[Vienna Convention] are diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international law."' 2001-NMSC-029,
14, 33 P.3d at 274 (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2000)).
169. 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 412 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
86604.pdf. An older version of the manual (which would have been in effect at the time Martinez-Rodriquez was
decided) used similar language, stating that "[o]ne of the basic functions of a consular office has been to provide
a 'cultural bridge' between the host community and the [U.S. National]. No one needs that cultural bridge more than
the individual U.S. citizen who has been arrested in a foreign country...." 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 401 (1984)
(as quoted in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2692 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
It is notable that, while the "cultural bridge" language has been removed, the focus on the individual remains.
170. Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar 31).
171. Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
172. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 40. In a recent case, the United States as amicus curiae argued that,
although Avena is not enforceable in United States courts, [the defendant] is entitled to review
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The President's memorandum thus provides powerful guidance from that branch
whose view the New Mexico Supreme Court accorded "great weight" in interpreting
Article 36 of the Convention.' 73 Although the court deciding Martinez-Rodriguez
did not have the benefit of the Presidential Memo, future courts hearing similar
claims should take note of the guidance it offers.174
D. Looking to the U.S. Supreme Courtfor Guidance
When the New Mexico Supreme Court decided in Martinez-Rodriguez that the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not create an individually
enforceable right, it cited a dictum in Breardv. Greene that "'neither the text nor the
history of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right
of action in United States courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for
violation of consular notification provisions.'"1 75 The problem is that Breard did not
actually decide that question and, in choosing to cite that particular dictum, the New
Mexico Supreme Court ignored an equally important dictum that the Convention
"arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following
arrest."' 76 As a consequence, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that an
individual detainee could not raise an Article 36 issue. 177 Because the U.S. Supreme
Court did not decide that question, a determination
of the relative weight of each of
78
those utterances is little more than speculation.
The language from Breardnotwithstanding, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed
several more years to pass since Martinez-Rodriguez without committing to a
position on whether a detainee has an individual right under the Convention. In the
face of the ambiguity that remains in the Supreme Court, the Breard dictum upon
which the New Mexico Supreme Court relied is not a good source of guidance.

and reconsideration [the remedy provided for in Avena] of the merits of his Vienna Convention
claim to the extent that his claim relies on the President's determination that review and
reconsideration.. .by [the state's] courts is necessary for compliance with the United States'
international obligations.
Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 324 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (penultimate alteration in
original).
173. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
174. It is true that the Presidential Memorandum addressed specifically Avena and constituted part of the
diplomatic effort to properly resolve the individual cases involved in that situation. See Kadish & Olson, supra note
145, at 1230. Furthermore, a recent case has argued that the President exceeded his constitutional authority by
attempting to direct courts to discharge duties under the ICJ's ruling. Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 335-36
(citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The
Memorandum, nonetheless, amounts to a positive reference to the ruling of the ICJ and should carry considerable
persuasive weight in determining the State Department's position on Article 36.
175. State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 16, 33 P.3d 267, 274 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 377 (1998)).
176. Breard,523 U.S. at 375.
177. Martinez-Rodriguez,2001-NMSC-029, 17, 33 P.3d at 274.
178. The language that the New Mexico Supreme Court cited, however, was not directly related to whether
an individual right was created under Article 36, but rather it spoke to whether a foreign nation could bring a private
cause of action under that provision. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 16, 33 P.3d at 274 ("[With] the
Supreme Court having expressed doubt that a signatory nation has a private right of action.... it seems unlikely to
us that the Court would find that an individual criminal defendant could pursue an action.") (citing Breard,523 U.S.
at 375). Seen as such, the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition that the Convention "arguably" creates an individual
right weighs against the New Mexico court's determination that the Court would disapprove of the existence of such
a right.
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The most recent case in the Supreme Court to discuss the issue, Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon,'79 provides little guidance beyond Breard and does not express any
disapproval of the notion that the Convention may create individually enforceable
rights. Instead, it assumes, arguendo, that one exists. 80 The majority in SanchezLlamas again declined to decide whether the Vienna Convention creates an
individual right and instead proceeded to dispose of the case by other means. 8' In
addition, four of the justices explicitly stated their opinion that the Vienna Convention does provide an individual right. 82 A recent analysis of the decision in SanchezLlamas contends that a likely 4-4 split exists on the question of whether Article 36
creates an individually enforceable right.183 According to the commentators, under
the current Court, Justice Kennedy would be the determinative vote.' 1 Based on his
joining in the majority opinion of the recent Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 85 decision,
"which strongly implied its support for finding individual rights under Common
Article 3 [of the Geneva Convention]-and because the case for finding rights under
Article 36 is stronger than the case for rights under Common Article 3-it is more
''
likely than not that he also supports finding individual rights under Article 36. I86
The U.S. Supreme Court seems, then, to be moving toward a finding that Article
36 creates an individually enforceable right. Therefore, however important the
Supreme Court's supposed disapproval as expressed in Breard was to the holding
in Martinez-Rodriguez, it has offered little guidance since that time. In SanchezLlamas, its wording was exceedingly ambiguous and at the least indicates a legal
landscape that is shifting in favor of a finding that Article 36 does create individual
rights. To the extent that Breard influenced the New Mexico Supreme Court's
rationale, that portion of the rationale should be abandoned.' 87

179. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
180. Id. at 2691 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. See supra Part II.D.
concurring) ("I agree that Article 36 of the Vienna
182. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2688 (Ginsburg, J.,
Convention grants rights that may be invoked by an individual in a judicial proceeding...."); id. at 2691 (Breyer,
J., dissenting; joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., as to part I) ("A criminal defendant may, at trial or in
a postconviction proceeding, raise the claim that state authorities violated the Convention in his case.").
183. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1199.
184. Id.
185. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
186. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1199-1200. According to Kadish and Olson, Kennedy may have
refrained from explicitly deciding the issue because of his belief that the Court should refrain from deciding issues
relating to treaty interpretation unnecessarily where Congress may give guidance. Id. at 1198. In reference to the
general attitude of the Supreme Court toward international norms or law, one commentator has said that "the
majority of the Justices sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court appear to be open to the possibility of using international
norms in the Court's adjudicative process... .Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy all seem to
favor this practice...." Josh Hsu, Looking Beyond the Boundaries: Incorporating InternationalNorms into the
Supreme Court's ConstitutionalJurisprudence,36 N.M. L. REV. 75, 77 (2006) (footnote omitted).
187. Considering that at least two bases for the rationale of Martinez-Rodriguezhave been undermined-that
the U.S. Supreme Court disapproves of finding an individual right and that the State Department's position is hostile
to such a finding-the New Mexico Supreme Court has a strong reason to revisit the holding that the Vienna
Convention does not create an individually enforceable right. Such a reexamination would be appropriate despite
the rule of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) ("[Wle may enquire
whether.. the law's growth in the intervening years has left [a case's] central rule a doctrinal anachronism
discounted by society; and whether [its] premises of fact have so far changed.. .as to render its central holding
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable...."). Now, the premises of facts are contrary to what was imagined by the court
in Martinez-Rodriguezto the extent that it relied on an assertion that the State Department and the Executive Branch
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E. The Possible Prejudice Caused by Vienna Convention Violations
In dicta, the court in Martinez-Rodriguezexplained that the defendant "[did] not
show[] that he was prejudiced 1 881 by the officers' failure to abide by the treaty"' 89
and was therefore not entitled to any of the remedies he sought.' 90 On the facts of the
case, this finding is sound. The defendant did not make inculpatory statements when
he spoke to the officers that allegedly violated his right to consular notice, 9 ' and the
fact that he was filing a pre-trial motion to suppress because of a violation of
consular notification rights indicates that he in fact had notice of such a right before
his trial. 2 Both at the arrest phase, during which he claimed the treaty violation
occurred, and at the trial phase the defendant failed to make a showing that the treaty
violation impacted his trial.' 93
Because the New Mexico Supreme Court disposed of the case by finding that no
individually enforceable right exists in Article 36, it did not fully develop its
discussion of the existence of lack of prejudice. The court's dicta on this point,
therefore, leaves open at least two possible interpretations. 94 One interpretation is
that the court simply found that the facts in Martinez-Rodriguez' case did not show
prejudice because the defendant did not make any inculpatory statements to
arresting officers before he became apprised of his rights under Article 36.'9' A
second would be that a violation of the Convention
is presumably non-prejudicial
196
when a defendant gives a proper Miranda waiver.
A reading of Martinez-Rodriguez as a fact-specific inquiry, devoid of any
presumption against prejudice for Vienna Convention violations, would provide a
fair framework for analyzing future Vienna Convention violations. First, it is the

of the Federal Government reject the finding of an individual right in the Convention. See State v. MartinezRodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 14, 33 P.3d 269, 274. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court no longer seems to
disapprove of the finding of an individual right in the Convention (if it ever did). These portions of the rationale
having been stripped, a future court could properly revisit that portion of the holding in Martinez-Rodriguez.
188. The New Mexico Court does not define "prejudice," but other courts have adopted a useful definition
in the context of a denial of the right to consular access. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has said
that,
[tio establish prejudice, the defendant must produce evidence that 1) he did not know of his
right; 2) he would have availed himself of the right had he known of it; and 3) "there was a
likelihood that the contact would have resulted in assistance to him in resisting [his charge]."
United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617
F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)). Despite the lack of a specific definition for prejudice, the New Mexico court
discusses the Defendant's case in terms similar to the factors enumerated by the Ninth Circuit. See MartinezRodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 19, 33 P.3d at 275 ("[Defendant] has not demonstrated how the violation of the
[Convention] affected the outcome of his case.").
189. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 19, 33 P.3d at 275.
190. Martinez-Rodriguez specifically requested that certain statements he made to arresting officers be
suppressed because when he made them he was not aware of his right to consular access. Id. 7, 33 P.3d at 271.
191. Id. 19, 33 P.3d at 275.
192. Seeid. 8,33P.3dat271.
193. Id. 20, 33 P.3d at 276.
194. It is useful to examine these interpretations and their accompanying implications because any possible
future recognition of an individually enforceable right under the Convention in New Mexico would require it to
determine whether it provides a useful analysis for the claims that would be brought.
195. Martinez-Rodriguez,2001-NMSC-029, 19, 33 P.3d at 275.
196. Id. 1 20, 33 P.3d at 276 ("'Prejudice has never been-nor could reasonably be-found in a case where
a foreign national was given, understood, and waived his or her Miranda rights."' (quoting United States v.
Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (S.D. Cal. 1999))).
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fairest reading of the language of the case. In Martinez-Rodriguez, even aside from
the fact that the physical evidence was overwhelming against the defendant,'97 thus
decreasing the likelihood that his lack of access to a consul was prejudicial, the
defendant actually had notification of his right before his trial."' He therefore could
have had the benefit of consular access at least throughout his trial. Under such
circumstances, there would be no reason to read into the case a broad rule that
Vienna Convention violations are presumptively non-prejudicial. To do so would
be to subject the court to criticism for establishing broad and improper precedent
where a narrow ruling would have sufficed on the facts. As one author has noted
with reference to other consular notification cases, and as Justice Blackmun rightly
observed in another context, "'easy cases make bad law.'''1.9 A narrow reading of
Martinez-Rodrigueztherefore avoids this accusation of overreaching and establishing precedent that was unnecessary to disposition of the case.2" Such a reading is
also most fair, considering the facts and language of the case.
In addition, a fact-specific analysis has textual support in the language of Article
36 of the Convention2"' and in the interpretation of Article 36 as set forth by the ICJ
in LaGrandand Avena.20 2 While Article 36 defers to the "laws and regulations of the
receiving State," 20 3 it also supplies the proviso that those laws and regulations "must

enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under
[the] article are intended. '2' According to the Convention, then, the receiving State
cannot rely on its own laws and regulations to subvert the purposes of the convention.
The ICJ's clarification of this point in its creation of the "review and
reconsideration" remedy reflects an attempt to reconcile the tension between the

197. The court noted that Martinez-Rodriguez was arrested while driving the stolen vehicle of one of the
murder victims. Id. U 3-4, 33 P.3d at 270-71. The Court further observed that
Defendant's fingerprints were in the motel room [where the murder occurred] on an
identification card of one of the victims. His fingerprints and his saliva, identified from DNA
testing, were found on a beer can in the motel room. His DNA was also matched to anal swabs
taken from the body of the third victim.
Id. 6, 33 P.3d at 271.
198. This is evident from the fact that the Defendant raised the Vienna Convention in a pre-trial motion. Id.
8, 33 P.3d at 271.
199. Daniel J. Lehman, Comment, The Federal Republic of Germany v. The United States of America: The
Individual Right to ConsularAccess, 20 LAW & INEQ. 313, 334 (2002) (quoting O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing
Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 804 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
200. The same observation applies to the court's method of disposing the case by finding that the Vienna
Convention does not create an individually enforceable right. As other courts have done, the New Mexico court
could have avoided making a decision on standing and found that in this case no prejudice was present considering
the overwhelming physical evidence and the fact that any alleged right to consular notice would not have impacted
the outcome of the case. See supra Part R.E.
201. As the treaty itself provides, "The rights...of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended." Vienna
Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T.77, art. 36(2).
202. The court in LaGrand called upon American courts to provide "review and reconsideration." See
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 126 (June 27). Subsequently, Avena refined this, explaining that such
review and reconsideration should be of a judicial nature and should be done with attention to possible prejudice
caused by the Vienna convention violation. Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, IN
138-40 (Mar. 31).
203. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(2).
204. Id.

724
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State's ability to apply its own laws and its obligation to allow those laws to give
way when they would interfere with the purposes of the treaty. The ICJ's approach
suggests that this tension should be resolved in a flexible manner that takes into
account the specific facts of each alleged violation.0 5 The Avena opinion specifically says that the receiving state must "guarantee that the violation and the possible
prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined. ''2' 6 The International
Court's reference to "possible prejudice," in light of the deference that the treaty
makes to the receiving State's law, evinces a lack of need for a presumption of any
kind, whether for or against prejudice, and instead asks American courts to be
flexible in their review of Vienna Convention claims within the limits of their own
law.
Other commentators have endorsed the view that American courts should
examine Article 36 violations with a "case-by-case evaluation of the facts to
determine the prejudicial effect of the violation on the defendant's constitutional
rights."2 7 This fact-specific inquiry could be conducted in a neutral fashion, without
a presumption either for or against prejudice. The standard applied could be the one
enunciated in the Ninth Circuit deportation cases. 20 8 Under such a case-by-case
analysis, a court would examine each alleged Article 36 violation and would ask
whether the detainee knew of his right, whether "he would have availed himself of
the right had he known of it," and whether "there was a likelihood that the contact
would have resulted in assistance to him in resisting [his charge]. ' 2°
Martinez-Rodriguez might also be interpreted as holding that violations of the
Convention are presumed to be non-prejudicial to defendants. This would be the
broadest reading of the case and least in line with the purposes of the treaty and with
the ICJ's interpretation.
Such a presumption against prejudice, if adopted as the rule, would be based on
the New Mexico Supreme Court's statement in Martinez-Rodriguezto the effect that
the protections afforded by Article 36 are duplicative of other constitutional
protections. 21 Such a rule would be erroneous for various reasons.
First, it is exactly this type of inflexibility that the text of the Convention attempts
to discourage in the proviso that "full effect.. .be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under [Article 36] are intended. ' 21 Similarly, the ICJ has
encouraged flexibility where domestic legal principles may, in some instances, need
to give way to the obligations of the treaty.212
Second, it is possible to imagine circumstances under which a violation of the
consular notice provisions of Article 36 would be prejudicial. For example, citizens
of countries that are notorious for human rights violations may carry an inherent fear
of brutal or corrupt law enforcement, and when they encounter American police they

205. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 138.
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. Lehman, supra note 200, at 331.
208. United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (1989) (citing United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617
F.3d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)).
209. Id. (quoting Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.3d at 533).
210. State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 20, 33 P.3d 269, 276.
211. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(2).
212. Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, H 138-40 (Mar. 31).
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may expect the same harsh treatment for silence or non-cooperation that they would
see with the police of their own country. Even reading the Miranda rights would
mean little to such a detainee. 1 3 For example, for some foreign detainees, "Miranda
warnings alone may be insufficient to explain the American right against selfincrimination. The right to counsel in the United States may be similarly incomprehensible to foreign nationals who may presume that a public defender appointed by
the state will represent the state. 21 4 In circumstances such as these, the detainee may
be improperly induced to make false inculpatory statements or to otherwise proceed
while ignorant of the rights afforded to him under our criminal justice system.
Seen as such, rather than being duplicative of Miranda,the rights under Article
36 may at times be necessary to facilitate foreign detainees' understanding of the
Mirandarights. Violations of the Convention would therefore result in failure of the
requirements of the Mirandarights, since those rights must be given and understood
in order to be valid.2 5 In other words, there are circumstances where a foreign
detainee can only properly understand his Miranda rights if he is afforded the right
to consular access.
Aside from Miranda,the circumstances under which a foreign detainee who does
not know of his right to consular access makes inculpatory statements or confessions
may indicate a lack of voluntariness. 2 6 In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court left
the door open, saying, "defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader
challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to police., 21 7 Defendants should,
therefore, be able to raise the argument that "Article 36 claims should be included
in the totality of the circumstances test [or a state's counterpart to that test] applied
by state 21and
federal courts to determine whether 'a confessant's will was over8
borne."
These arguments reflect what is said to be a core value protected by Article 36 of
the Convention: the right to consular access is supposed to provide a cultural bridge
for those detained in foreign lands. 2 9 This argument is based on the idea that the
Vienna Convention accords a "cultural bridge" between the detainee and the

213. This is not a mere hypothetical. Amnesty International has pointed out that the state agents of over 150
countries apply torture and mistreat detainees. See Lehman, supra note 200, at 313 n.1. As Lehman observes, "One
could imagine how a citizen of one of these nations would perceive her situation when in the custody of U.S.
authorities and unaware of the safeguards afforded to those within the U.S. criminal justice system." Id.
214. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1187-88 (footnote omitted).
215. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.").
216. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1209.
217. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682 (2006). This is an encouraging crack in the door, but
it is still only a crack. Furthermore, it is ambiguous because the question of whether the Convention can even be
raised by a criminal defendant is one of standing. As the New Mexico Supreme Court has stated, Article 36 "does
not create judicially enforceable individual rights that can be remedied in the criminal justice systems of the member
states." State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 14, 33 P.3d 267, 274 (citing United States v. Li, 206 F.3d
56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2000)). The New Mexico Supreme Court thus seems to close the door even to a voluntariness
claim because it would require that an individual have standing to raise it for judicial enforcement.
218. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1209 (quoting Smith v. Duckworth, 859 F.2d 909, 912 (7th Cir.
1988)). Under the totality of the circumstances test, which was enunciated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the court
considers several factors, such as "the youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low intelligence; [and] the
lack of any advice [about] his constitutional rights." 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (citations omitted).
219. See supra note 169.
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receiving state. 22' The New Mexico Supreme Court did not address the necessity of
a cultural bridge arguably because the facts in Martinez-Rodriguezdid not call for
it. In other cases, however, the cultural bridge could be crucial to a detainee
receiving a fair trial. If the detainee, for example, came from a country where protections such as those found in the American criminal justice system do not exist, he
may be severely harmed because he does not understand what such protections
mean, or he may doubt the reality of such protections, even when enunciated by
state agents.22 1 In such a case, the right to confer with a consulate would be critical
in educating the detainee.
In addition, beyond the initial detention and interrogation process, foreign
nationals who experience trial and sentencing without knowledge of their right to
consular notification stand to suffer serious consequences. Without consular access,
even if they have access to counsel, linguistic or cultural barriers may impede their
counsel from communicating important concepts or information. In such a case,
consular access would increase the chances that the detainee would understand the
legal system and the consequences of his actions.222
Moreover, the presumption against prejudice requires guesswork about the nature
of detainees facing violations of their rights under the Convention. Since the need
for a cultural bridge is at the heart of the prejudice that can arise from Vienna
Convention violations, 223 the presumption that the cultural bridge is unnecessary
would need to be based on an assumption that fewer detainees are being prejudiced
than are not when their rights are violated under the Convention.
Furthermore, unlike a presumption in favor of prejudice, for which some commentators have argued and which could at least be viewed as a deterrent to violations regardless of the number or scope of litigants who are or are not prejudiced,
the presumption against prejudice does not serve a similar external goal. In fact, the
presumption against prejudice might even encourage lassitude among law
enforcement, because defendants who could show their rights were violated would
still have to overcome a presumption that they did not suffer prejudice. When the
scale is tipped toward the state, it will have little incentive to honor the obligations
that the United States has undertaken. Therefore, a presumption against prejudice
is possibly the least favorable of the approaches available from a reading of
Martinez-Rodriguez. Its basis in reality would be unclear, and it would not help
bring law enforcement into compliance with the Convention.

220. Kadish, supra note 98, at 38 ("U.S. courts should follow the lead of the Inter-American Court and find

that prejudice is presumed when an Article 36 violation occurs."). Note that the State Department has at least given
the impression that it would presume prejudice where its own citizens faced detention abroad in saying that "[flew
of our citizens need [consular] assistance more than those who have been arrested in a foreign country or imprisoned
in a foreign jail." Supra note 169 and accompanying text. The "cultural bridge" language that the State Department
used in the prior version of its manual reflects the same sentiment.
221. See Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1187-88.
222. In a case such as this, adherence to the consular notice provisions would "enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights accorded under [Article 36] are intended." Vienna Convention, supra note 2,
21 U.S.T. 77, art. 36(2). If detainees were informed of their right on a routine basis, their consul, if it chose to do
so, could aid them in quickly finding competent counsel that would ensure that their rights were protected.
223. See Kadish, supra note 98, at 38.
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As a final comment on prejudice, one approach that seems foreclosed by the court
in Martinez-Rodriguez is the presumption that violations of the convention are
prejudicial.224 Some commentators, however, have advocated for such a position.225
One drawback to the "presumptive prejudice" approach is that it could result in
remedies such as suppression or overturned convictions where such remedies are not
deserved. For example, circumstances may arise under which defendants who are
obviously guilty will have their convictions overturned, forcing a new trial. This
would be a drain on limited court resources. The counter to this is that, in a fashion
similar to Miranda rights, the risk of suppression or overturned convictions would
serve as a strong incentive for law enforcement to understand and honor the
pertinent provisions of the Convention. And, as compliance increased, the occasion
to suppress evidence or overturn convictions might decrease.
One other problem with a presumption of prejudice is that such a presumption
may not accurately reflect reality for most alleged Vienna Convention violations. A
presumption of prejudice reflects the notion that, more often than not, a foreign
detainee stands in need of the "cultural bridge" afforded by consular access. It also
assumes that the detainee's consulate is more likely to offer assistance than not. If
the main cases involving consular notice violations are any indication of reality,
however, at least some detainees are less likely to have suffered prejudice.226 Even
in the absence of statistical data, the multitude of conceivable circumstances under
which foreign detainees might not be prejudiced by a Violation of the Convention
militates against a presumption of prejudice.227
A flexible, case-by-case approach therefore appears to be the most useful. It does
not suffer the infirmities inherent in presumptions for or against prejudice, and it
allows the court enough flexibility to offer a remedy where violation of the Convention has prejudiced a foreign national. Furthermore, by following an approach that
is in line with the ICJ's recent ruling in Avena 228 and allowing for reconsideration
and review for prejudice, the New Mexico Supreme Court would further the overall
policies underlying the treaty and would help bring the United States into
compliance.

224. See State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 19, 33 P.3d 269, 275 (agreeing "with other courts
which have required a showing of prejudice"). As far as announcing a rule, this language agreeing that a detainee
must make a showing of prejudice is antagonistic to the idea that a presumption of prejudice exists.
225. Kadish, supra note 98, at 38 ("U.S. courts should follow the lead of the Inter-American Court and find
that prejudice is presumed when an Article 36 violation occurs.").
226. For example, in LaGrand, the brothers seeking relief through Article 36 on the basis of German
citizenship were German only as a technicality. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1i 13 (June 27). They
came to the United States as young children and only left once for a short period. Id. They were also the adoptive
children of a U.S. national. Id. In Martinez-Rodriguez, the defendant's conviction was based on overwhelming
evidence against him, and it appears that he made no inculpatory statements. 2001-NMSC-029,1 19, 33 P.3d at 275.
In such cases, the Article 36 violation does not impact the outcome because either the defendant had no need of the
cultural bridge to apprise him of his option, or the defendant simply did not inculpate himself even if he did not have
access to consul. In either event, no prejudice seems to be demonstrated.
227. For example, many foreign nationals who face the possibility of detention in the United States may have
resided in the United States for extended periods of time. Many such potential detainees may come from developed
nations where concepts of due process, though not exactly the same as those in the United States, are comparable.
228. Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, 1 138 (Mar. 31).
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V. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDIES
Even if a court recognizes that the Convention confers an individually
enforceable right and that a violation of the Convention resulted in prejudice, the
question still remains: What remedy should be granted? The New Mexico Supreme
Court was virtually silent on this question in Martinez-Rodriguezbecause it found
that no individual right existed, 229 and even if such rights did exist, the defendant
before the court was not prejudiced by any violation of alleged rights under the
treaty.230 The court only went as far as saying that suppression would be an
inappropriate remedy in the event that the defendant did have standing to bring a
" ' Given the paucity of
claim that his rights to consular notification were violated.23
suggestions from the New Mexico Supreme Court concerning remedies for Vienna
Convention violations, it is necessary to look elsewhere for guidance.
Because of its supposed expertise on interpreting the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the ICJ is a fitting place to begin the search for a remedy to the
right of consular notification. In LaGrand,the ICJ recommended a basic framework
for a remedy for violations of the Convention. 232 The ICJ then clarified the meaning
and application of that framework in Avena: where there has been a violation of the
consular notice provisions, there must be a means of effective review and
reconsideration of both the trial and the sentence.233 That review and reconsideration
should entail a "procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation
'
of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention."234
In developing that framework,

the ICJ was intentionally vague and deferential, taking into account the right of the
United States to apply its own laws. 235 The ICJ did note, however, that judicial rules
like procedural default, though not in violation of the Convention generally, may be
applied in a way that violates the treaty.236
The ICJ's rule is a useful starting point because it provides the basic framework
that a procedure must exist by which violations can be reviewed and by which the
legal impact and prejudice of those violations can be considered.2 37 From that point,
however, a Court must still consider exactly what should be done if a violation is
reviewed and found to be prejudicial. The following are some possibilities.
A. Suppression as a Remedy for Article 36 Violations
The remedy that is most commonly sought, and which the defendant sought in
Martinez-Rodriguez,is suppression of evidence or statements gathered in purported
violation of Article 36.238 The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
expressed disapproval of such a remedy, saying that "the Constitution requires the

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
should be
236.
237.
238.

State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, 15, 33 P.3d 267, 274.
Id. 1 20, 33 P.3d at 276.
Id. 1 18, 33 P.3d at 275.
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104,1 125 (June 27).
2004 I.C.J. 128, IN 138-41.
Id. 1 139.
Id. 131 ("(Tlhe Court acknowledges that the concrete modalities for such review and reconsideration
left primarily to the United States.").
lit. 190.
Id. 138.
State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029,

7, 33 P.3d 267, 271.
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exclusion of evidence obtained by certain violations of the FourthAmendment and
confessions exacted by police in violation of the right against compelled selfincrimination or due process. '23 9 Because the Supreme Court has recently held that
this remedy is generally not available for Vienna Convention violations, 2' it would
be unlikely that any state court will do so. The door, however, may not be
completely closed. If the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that the Convention
did supply an individually enforceable right, suppression might be obtained by
relying on the Article 36 violation to show some other constitutional violation.24
The Supreme Court of the United States hinted at this approach by saying, "A
defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the
voluntariness of his statements to police. 242 If voluntariness can be challenged
through a showing of prejudice caused by an Article 36 violation, other constitutional or statutory violations should be equally susceptible to vindication using the
Convention.243
Thus far, this is the main approach that has worked in other courts. 244 Moreover,
it has the advantage of allowing a court to give effect to the Vienna Convention
without making a wild departure from accepted practice. As explained in SanchezLlamas, suppression is not a remedy that is lightly granted because it puts
substantial cost on the truth-finding process. 245 Where nothing in Article 36 indicates
that suppression is a remedy, and where a violation of the provision alone does not
prejudice a defendant, exclusion should therefore not be allowed. If, however, a
violation of the Convention impinges upon some constitutional or other legally
protected interest, a court should consider it and should be willing to grant relief in
the proper situation, even exclusion.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has said that it analyzes exclusion as "judicial
review of executive conduct." 246 Where executive conduct forms the basis of
enforcement of the consular notice provisions of Article 36, the New Mexico
judiciary should perform its duty in assuring that the state complies with the treaty

239. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2680 (2006) (citations omitted).
240. Id. at 2682.
241. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1211-20, 1208-23 (discussing other judicial remedies).
242. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
243. Kadish & Olson, supra note 145, at 1217 ("Under the Sanchez-Llamas majority's interpretation of the
'full effect' language in Article 36(2), an Article 36 violation could be raised in conjunction with any of the
'constitutional and statutory protections... (that] safeguard the same interests Sanchez-Llamas claims are advanced
by Article 36."' (alterations in original)). Kadish and Olson suggest specific possibilities such as ineffective counsel,
due process ("[wihere inability to obtain evidence results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"), or a failure by
a court to make appropriate accommodations. Id. at 1217-20.
244. See supra Part I1F. It is important to point out that in one of the cases discussed the reversal of a
conviction was granted rather than suppression. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W. 2d 134, 138 (Iowa 2001). The theory,
however, is the same because the Vienna Convention violation was seen as part of a broader attack on the
effectiveness of counsel. Id. at 152.
245. 126 S. Ct. at 2680. The Court observed that "[w]e have applied the exclusionary rule primarily to deter
constitutional violations... .Thefew cases in which we have suppressed evidence for statutory violations do not help
[the defendant]." Id. (emphasis added).
246. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431,446,863 P.3d 1052, 1067 (1993) (citing Thomas S. Schrock& Robert
C. Welsh, Up from Calandra:The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251,
324-26 (1974)).
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and should not shrink from invoking the exclusionary rule where an Article 36
violation causes a constitutional violation.247
B. Jury Instructions
One of the only other remedies for a violation of the right to consular notice seen
in a judicial setting has been a jury instruction.2 48 In a case before the Georgia
Supreme Court, the jury was instructed that the defendant in question may have
suffered a violation of his right to consular notice, and the court allowed the jury to
weigh that information in its determination of the voluntariness of the defendant's
statements.249
While the Georgia Supreme Court may be commended for its desire to offer a
remedy for violation of Article 36, jury instructions seem to be of limited use in
vindicating the rights of that provision. A major drawback to the use of jury
instructions is that they do nothing to encourage state law enforcement to live up to
its duties under the treaty. It would be much more effective to deprive law
enforcement of the use of evidence or statements gathered in a way that takes
advantage of foreign nationals who are deprived of the cultural bridge of Article 36.
Furthermore, from the point of view of a defendant, a jury instruction like the one
given in Georgia is a weak remedy. A jury may have as little understanding of the
need for access to consul and the cultural bridge it provides as the officers who
violate the provisions of the Convention. The policies underlying Article 36 should
not, therefore, be introduced into the decision-making process of a jury panel that
is not likely to value them.
A jury instruction, therefore, may not remedy prejudice caused to a detainee if
such prejudice occurs pursuant to a violation of Article 36. In addition, ajury charge
can have but marginal impact on the conduct of law enforcement, in whose hands
implementation of Article 36 lies.250
The more viable way to judicially vindicate the rights under Article 36 would be
to consider whether the violation caused prejudice such that it could form the basis
for an independent constitutional attack, such as voluntariness of statements or
ineffective assistance of counsel.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENFORCING ARTICLE 36 OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
When studying these cases dealing with Vienna Convention violations, it is easy
to ask, "why all of the fuss over a handful of particularly unsavory criminals, guilty
of some of the worst crimes imaginable?" In fact, some commentators have
observed that the animus behind the pursuit of the Vienna Convention claims is

247. See supra note 75 for a discussion of the exclusionary rule.
248. See Kadish, supra note 98, at 41 (citing State v. Ramirez, No. OOCR-3159-4 (Dekalb, Ga. Super. Ct.
2003)); Ramirez v. State, 619 S.E. 2d 668, 673-74 (Ga. 2005) (explaining that, in the trial court below, "an
instruction was given to the jury that would allow it to consider the mandate of the Convention in order to assess
the voluntariness of the statement").
249. Kadish, supra note 98, at 41.
250. See supra Part VI.A (discussing the New Mexico approach to exclusion as a means of checking the
executive).
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generally a desire to find ways to eliminate the death penalty in the United States.25'
Germany, for example, may have taken little or no interest in the case of Walter
LaGrand had he and his brother been given life sentences rather than the death
penalty. In fact, disgust with the practice of executing foreign nationals seems to be
the most plausible explanation for why Paraguay, Mexico, or any other nation would
expend such significant resources on instituting proceedings in the ICJ on behalf of
individuals who were proven to have committed horrible, violent crimes.252
Antipathy toward the death penalty, however, is not the only reason that many
individuals take an interest in the United States' frequent difficulties with Article 36
of the Convention. Among American observers, one important concern arises out
of the notion that U.S. failure to protect foreign citizens' rights within its own
borders will induce lassitude in other States that are parties to the Convention with
respect to the provisions of Article 36. One commentator has poignantly observed
that
[i]ndividual American citizens are placed in harm's way when the govermnent
fails to adequately protect the rights of foreign citizens in the United States. This
concern is larger than one case and is not spurred by sympathy for the likes of
Angel Breard. Would the Vienna Convention rights have made a difference to
make a difference
Angel Breard? Probably not. But will these same guarantees 253
to Americans detained abroad? You can bet their lives on it.
This concern for the safety of Americans abroad is compelling and is echoed by the
State Department in the context of the consular notice provisions of the
Convention.254
This hearkens to the contractual nature of the Convention. Each party that has
signed and ratified the treaty has, in essence, given up a small amount of its
sovereign ability to deal with nationals from other signatory nations as it unilaterally
chooses. The parties have given up that ability in exchange for a guarantee that their
own citizens will benefit as states receiving their citizens honor reciprocal obligations under the treaty. If a nation would like to be free of its obligation to enforce
the treaty, it should give up its right to rely on the same treaty, and should withdraw.
In addition to the arguments about the death penalty and the safety of U.S.
citizens abroad, it is important to note that a belief in the notion of due process
should animate adherence to the Convention. The cases of Angel Breard, Ricardo
Martinez-Rodriguez, or the LaGrand brothers may not have raised serious due

251. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals,and the Horizontal Integrationof International
Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 755, 757 (2006). Discussing recent cases in which Vienna Convention
violations have been raised, McGuiness argues that
[t]he... cases arose not out of an abstract concern about U.S. treaty violations, or even out of
concerns about the general effects of failures to notify foreign nationals of their fights-though,
to be sure, these concerns motivated particular actors at particular times. That these cases arose
at all was because the United States was out of step with an international trend toward de facto
and de jure abolition of the death penalty.
Id.
252. See, e.g., Fleishman, supranote 19, at 359 ("The Mexican government has spent unprecedented effort
and resources on behalf of Mexican nationals facing death sentences in the United States.").
253. Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 149 (1999).
254. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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process questions. After all, Breard and Rodriguez were convicted of macabre
crimes, and their convictions rested mainly upon overwhelming physical evidence.
The Vienna Convention violations likely did not profoundly affect the outcome of
their cases. Similarly, the need for a cultural bridge may not have been particularly
strong for the LaGrand brothers who, despite their German citizenship, lived most
of their lives in the United States, were more American than German, and may not
have even spoken German.255 The United States, however, as a whole and as the
several states, has a responsibility to fulfill its obligations under the treaty so that
violations will be less likely when cases come along in which real prejudice could
result.
VII. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court should reopen the door for defendants wishing
to vindicate violations of their rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. The court should therefore revisit Martinez-Rodriguezand find
that Article 36 supplies an individually enforceable right. By doing so, New Mexico
courts would be more faithful to the text of the Vienna Convention. Furthermore,
such a rule would be in harmony with the rulings of the ICJ, whose interpretations
of the Vienna Convention offer guidance to all signatories and parties. Finally,
finding an individual right in Article 36 would not be adverse to U.S. Supreme
Court precedent and likely would presage a similar result in that Court.
The New Mexico Supreme Court should also avoid presumptions for or against
prejudice in the event of violations and should instead conduct a case-by-case
inquiry to determine whether a defendant was prejudiced at any stage of the
proceedings by that violation. Finally, the court should be willing to examine that
possible prejudice to determine whether it caused some other constitutional failing
that would trigger the remedy of suppression. This remedy is most likely available
for Vienna Convention violations if the violation can be argued as incorporated into
some other constitutional claim such as ineffective counsel or a challenge to
voluntariness.

255. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, 1 13 (June 27).

